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Performance Spillovers and Social Network in the Workplace: 
Evidence from Rural and Urban Weavers in a Chinese Textile Firm
*
 
We provide some of the first rigorous evidence on performance spillovers and social network 
in the workplace. The data we use are rather extraordinary – weekly data for rejection rates 
(proportion of defective output) for all weavers in a firm during a 12 months (April 2003-March 
2004) period, more than 10,000 observations. Our fixed effect estimates first point to 
significant spillovers of performance from high-ability weavers to low-ability weavers. On the 
other hand, we find no evidence for performance spillovers from low-ability to high-ability 
weavers. The findings are consistent with the knowledge sharing hypothesis that low-ability 
workers learn from high-ability workers but not vice versa. Second, by exploiting the well-
documented fact that an exogenously-formed sharp divide between urban workers and rural 
migrant workers exists in firms in Chinese cities, we find that performance 
spillovers/knowledge sharing take place only within the confines of social network. 
Specifically rural low-ability weavers are found to improve their performance as their high-
ability teammates (who are also rural migrants) improve their performance while they do not 
benefit from performance improvement of their high-ability teammates who are urban 
residents. Such heterogeneous performance interdependence of workers within the same 
team suggests that our evidence for performance spillovers is less likely to be a result of 
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Performance Spillovers and Social Network in the Workplace:  
Evidence from Rural and Urban Weavers in a Chinese Textile Firm 
 
I. Introduction 
Spillovers of performance among workers in the workplace occur as a result of knowledge 
sharing and peer pressure/monitoring. Knowledge sharing in the workplace takes a form of 
transfer of human capital from high-ability workers to low-ability workers as well as a form of 
mutual learning process for workers of equal ability to improve their performance together. Such 
knowledge sharing may take place on the job in the case of team production. However, even in 
the absence of team production, knowledge sharing may occur off the job through formal offline 
problem solving team activities as well as informal channels such as talking over dinner and tea 
in the firm’s dormitory.  
On the other hand, peer pressure in the workplace arises when shirking generates disutility 
for a worker under the presence of her coworkers. Peer pressure may also result from the 
worker’s desire to outperform her colleagues in the workplace, and hence hard work of one 
worker generates hard work of her coworkers.   
Economists have been increasingly aware of the importance of such spillovers of 
performance among workers in the workplace through knowledge sharing and peer pressure. For 
example, peer monitoring, knowledge sharing and hence performance spillovers among team 
members in the workplace play a central role in the theory of “high performance work system” 
or “high involvement work system” (Gant, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2002; Appelbaum, et. al., 
2000). In addition, performance spillovers play an important role in economics of organization 
(e.g., Aoki, 1986; Kandel and Lazear, 1992), growth theory (e.g., Lucas, 1988), and FDI (e.g., 
Fosfuri, et. al., 2001).  
However, direct evidence on such performance spillovers in the workplace is rare, for   2
such evidence requires researchers to go deep inside the black-box of the firm and obtain rare 
access to “insider” data on performance of individual workers. Pioneering works using internal 
personnel data in economic research include Medoff and Abraham (1980), and Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b). More recently, a number of studies (e.g.  Lazear, 2000, Kleiner and 
Helper, 2003, Fernie and Metcalf, 1999, Paarsh and Shearer, 1999, Knez and Simester, 2001, 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005), use such “insider” data and study the effects on individual 
worker performance of a change in pay methods (e.g., the switch from time rates to piece rates or 
to performance pay). A related line of work examines the effects on individual worker 
performance of the shift to team-based production (e.g. Batt, 1999, Hamilton, Nickerson and 
Owan, 2002, and Jones and Kato, 2007). None of these studies examine performance spillovers.  
New econometric case studies on the subject are emerging, however. Mas and Moretti 
(2006) use individual productivity data on supermarket cashiers at a large supermarket chain in 
California and provide direct evidence on performance spillovers though peer pressure. Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul (2007) use individual productivity data on fruit pickers at a leading U.K. 
agriculture firm and show that workers tend to conform to their friend’s productivity level. 
Finally, Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2007) exploit random groupings of professional golfers 
and test the peer effects of professional golf tournaments. Unlike the first two studies, they find 
no evidence for peer effects.
1   
In this paper we use individual performance data on weavers at a large textile firm in 
China and provide direct evidence on performance spillovers. Our study complements Mas and 
Moretti (2006), Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007) and Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2007) 
on two important accounts.  
First, our study takes advantage of the well-documented social divide between urban 
                                                        
1 Falk and Ichino (2006) provide experimental evidence on peer effects.   3
workers and rural migrant workers in China’s transition economy and examine for the first time 
potentially important interplay between performance spillovers and such exogenously-formed 
and clearly-defined social networks (rural migrant worker network vs. urban worker network).  
The potentially important role of social network in worker’s decision making has been 
reported in the literature (e.g., Duflo and Saez, 2004 who find that female workers’ retirement 
investment decisions are correlated with the other female workers’ decisions in the same 
department, but not the male workers’). Thus, it is possible that workers interact with each other 
mostly in sub-groups within the team. Some workers may find it easier to communicate with 
those who share similar characteristics such as gender or regional background. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that some workers prefer to learn from differences rather than similarities and 
thus choose to interact more with people from different backgrounds. Ultimately this is an 
empirical question that needs to be tested. 
In the context of an urban Chinese enterprise, there is a strong social divide between urban 
workers and rural migrant workers.  The relaxation of the regulations on rural-urban migration in 
1988 encouraged many rural workers to look for a job in the urban areas and get paid higher than 
what they earn from doing agricultural work at home. However, it is not easy for rural migrant 
workers to gain an urban housing registration (“hu kou”). This tends to produce a significant 
entry barrier for rural migrants, and inequality between the rural and urban labor force. Without 
urban housing registration, rural workers are ineligible for many high-paying urban jobs as well 
as the urban welfare programs such as healthcare and schooling (Huang, 2001). A rural worker 
must also pay for a temporary residence permit in order to find a legal residence in the urban 
areas. In conclusion, there is significant adjustment cost for a rural migrant to work in the urban 
area. Huang (2001) find that a rural female migrant is usually only able to find the low-paid,   4
low-benefit urban jobs. Nevertheless such jobs may still be more attractive than the limited 
opportunities at home. 
While China has recently been reforming towards a market economy,  the reform is still 
far from complete and the hu kou system has been standing in the way of free labor mobility 
(Fleisher and Yang, 2006). Furthermore, the sharp distinction between the urban and rural status 
may create a separate sense of identity. The rural workers are constantly reminded of being an 
outsider. Having been through similar difficulties working in the urban area, the rural workers in 
the firm may form a stronger tie among themselves.  At the same time, the urban workers may 
find it easier to communicate with the other urban workers as they come from similar 
background (Nielsen, et. al., 2006 and Lu and Song, 2006).   
Our ability to identify two clearly-defined and exogenously-formed social networks 
within the same team also provides us with an important methodological advantage. Specifically, 
we are able to uncover heterogeneous performance interdependence of workers within the same 
team (e.g., a rural migrant worker improves her performance as her rural migrant teammates 
improve their performance yet no such performance interdependence exists between her and her 
urban teammates). As such, our evidence for performance spillovers is less likely to be a result of 
team specific shocks that generate spurious performance interdependence of all team members.  
Second, the afore-mentioned three recent working papers focus on peer pressure rather 
than knowledge sharing as a source of performance spillovers due to the nature of work and 
production technology of their subjects. The skill requirements for supermarket cashiers (in the 
case of Mas and Moretti, 2006) and fruit pickers (in the case of Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 
2007) are quite low and the scope for knowledge sharing is extremely limited. Guryan, Kroft and 
Notowidigdo (2007) study competitive professional athletes in high-stake golf tournaments and   5
knowledge sharing among these competitors during the tournament is highly unlikely. Unlike 
these peer effect studies, we use data from a manufacturing firm. The extensive field research at 
our Chinese textile firm reveals that there is significant scope for knowledge sharing among our 
weavers due to the nature of their work and production technology (see the next section for more 
details). On our reading of the literature, our paper is the first attempt to provide individual 
worker-level evidence on performance spillovers of workers who engage in significant 
knowledge sharing.  
In sum, we provide some of the most reliable evidence to date on performance spillovers 
and social network in the workplace. The data we use are rather extraordinary –weekly data for 
rejection rates (proportion of defective output) for all weavers in a firm during a 12 months 
(April 2003-March 2004) period, including more than 10,000 observations. First, our fixed effect 
estimates show that performance spillovers occur from high-ability workers to low-ability 
workers but not from low-ability to high-ability workers. Second, social network appears to play 
an important role in such performance spillovers. Thus, performance of a low-ability worker is 
significantly influenced by performance of her high-ability teammates within the same social 
network (migrant workers from rural areas in the context of our Chinese textile firm) while it is 
not affected by performance of her high-ability teammates outside of the social network (urban 
workers).  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the case and data. Section III 
reports the regression results. Section IV concludes.  
 
II. The Case, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our case, SCT, is located in an area in which many textile firms are to be found in China,   6
Shijiangzhuang, the capital of Hebei province.
2 Originally the firm was state-owned and 
suffering from the financial crisis that affected many Chinese firms during the 1990’s with 
outdated equipment, an aging workforce, and a shrinking market contributing to the firm’s 
difficulties. The threat of bankruptcy led to ownership restructuring as an alternative solution to 
closure and the value of the firm’s assets was transferred completely to employees in 1998. 
During the study period the total labor force averaged about 3500 employees.   
In collaboration with Xiao-Yuan Dong and Derek C. Jones, we collected several kinds of 
data from the case.
3 These were collected during a lengthy study period when we visited the firm 
twice and met with and interviewed the Director of Human Resources, the Director of the 
Weaving Division, a line supervisor and two team leaders at the Weaving Division, and the 
Director of Data Management (who was in charge of all internal data). In addition, to get 
perspective from an outsider, we also interviewed a long-term consultant for SCT who has been 
observing the firm for many years. As well as collecting various performance and personnel data, 
we also deepened our knowledge of the case by collecting data from a survey that we designed 
and administered to all team leaders.  
Our key data are a panel for all 297 weavers who worked in SCT at any time during the 12 
month period spanning the first week of April 2003 to the last week of March 2004.
4 We chose 
this group of employees because an accurate objective measure of individual worker 
performance with little measurement error is available consistently for all workers during this 
period. In addition, we were able to match these worker performance data with personnel data, 
using unique employee IDs. Table 1 summarizes personal characteristics of our weavers. The 
                                                        
2 Our confidentiality agreement with SCT prohibits us from revealing the actual name of the firm. 
3 See Dong, Jones and Kato, 2007 for details on the data.   
4 There were actually a dozen of weavers in our data who worked for only one week and less than 
15 hours during the week. We have no reliable performance data for such weavers.     7
vast majority of weavers are female (97%). The education level is uniform across the work force: 
all weavers have graduated from junior high school but not high school. About 63% of weavers 
are rural migrant workers.
5  
SCT uses a standard three-shift operation and each shift has six teams based on the location 
of the weaving rooms. Thus, there are a total number of eighteen teams. Each team has on 
average 10 to 11 weavers throughout the year. There was no switching of weavers between teams 
during the time period under study. When a new weaver joins SCT, our field research suggests 
that there is no systematic rule in her team assignment (for example, SCT has neither explicit nor 
implicit policy/practice to assign a new weaver with high-ability to a struggling team to boost its 
team performance). At the end of the next section, we will also show econometrically that the 
random team assignment hypothesis is indeed supported by the quantitative data.      
A quick glance at the weaving workplace gives observers a first impression that the role of 
weavers in the production process is rather limited since the operation appears to be fully 
automated and various fabrics are produced by automated looms rather than by individual 
weavers. However, a closer look at the workplace reveals that weavers have significant 
responsibilities. For example, problems (such as broken threads) do occur from time to time and 
each weaver’s main task is to pay close attention to her assigned loom machines (multiple loom 
machines are assigned to each weaver) and minimize the occurrence of such operational 
problems. If a problem does arise, each weaver is expected to solve the problem quickly and 
effectively. Good weavers will detect early signs of problems and make timely adjustments to the 
operational process so that problems will not fully materialize and hence no defective product 
will result. Should problems actually occur, the better weavers will solve them promptly and 
                                                        
5 The data also include information on whether each weaver is an employee owner (or holding 
stock of SCT). We find no significant interplay between performance spillovers and employee ownership.    8
efficiently, so that there will be minimal production of defective output. Due to the problem-
solving nature of their jobs, SCT constantly tells their weavers how important quality is, and 
implores them to work toward “zero defects”.  
In short, the nature of weaving technology and the problem-solving nature of a weaver’s job 
at SCT indicates that the most relevant and crucial performance measure for weavers is quality, 
which SCT measures by each weaver’s weekly defect rate (percentage of defective output 
generated per week). We are most fortunate that SCT granted us full access to each weaver’s 
weekly defect rate for all 297 weavers who ever worked in the Weaving Division during the 12 
month study period spanning the first week of April 2003 to the last week of March 2004.  
SCT requires each of the 12 teams to hold team meetings during the meal break, once or 
twice a month to discuss issues concerning quality and exchange each other’s experience of 
dealing with problems arising from production. Each team is also encouraged to hold 
“voluntary” team meetings after work as well. According to our own survey of all team leaders, 
nearly all teams meet once a week (four times a month). The average team meeting lasts about an 
hour. In addition, each team is required to hold a training session after work at least once a week. 
The purpose of such sessions is to help each other enhance skill level. Each team also plans 
recreation activities such as picnics, sports, and so on.  
In short, the main function of their team activities is knowledge sharing. In fact, it is the 
only “formal” mechanism for knowledge sharing among weavers. During regular work hours, 
weavers in the team work independently from each other. In fact, each weaver is typically 
assigned to more than 6 loom machines and required to pay exclusive attention to those 
machines. As such, during regular hours, any interactions between weavers are prohibited and do 
not happen.        9
Our informant (HR director) however adds that there is an important informal mechanism 
of knowledge sharing. After work, weavers engage in knowledge sharing informally. The 
informal knowledge sharing mechanism is particularly important for rural migrant workers. They 
are mostly young single women from rural villages of Hebei Province and speak the same dialect. 
All of them live in the company dormitory free of charge (5 or 6 per room). As such, after work 
they return to the same dorm, eat dinner in the same dining hall, and often socialize together. 
There are ample opportunities to engage in informal knowledge sharing over dinner, tea or other 
social activities.  
As explained above, in light of the problem solving nature of the main task of weavers, the 
most relevant weaver performance measure is defect rate (the percentage of defective cloth 
produced). The summary statistics in Table 2 show that on average, 0.25 percent of total weekly 
output produced by each weaver is defective. Though the magnitude of the defect rate appears 
small, “zero defect” is extremely difficult to achieve. In fact, during the 53-week period, no 
weaver was able to achieve “zero defect”. This also confirms our field observation that 
automated loom machines are far from perfect and problems do occur from time to time. 
Exclusive, focused and educated attention to these machines by weavers is indeed an integral 
part of high-performance workplace. We also calculate the aggregate defect rate of a weaver’s 
teammates, or the proportion of total output produced by all of her teammates that is defective.  
To examine whether performance spillovers are unidirectional, we divide all weavers into 
high-ability and low-ability weavers (see below for precisely how we define high-ability and 
low-ability). If a key mechanism for performance spillovers is knowledge sharing, we are likely 
to observe the unidirectional performance spillovers from high-ability to low-ability but not from 
low-ability to high-ability.    10
It is plausible that performance spillovers may be greater for those weavers who have spent 
more time in the team, for knowledge sharing (and peer pressure) is likely to be more relevant 
for such regular and incumbent team members. For example, Mas and Moretti (2006) found that 
cashiers whose shifts frequently overlap with each other tend to have greater amount of mutual 
monitoring. The scope of knowledge sharing may be greater for weavers who have worked 
together more and thus have developed a stronger tie. In our case, many weavers took three 
weeks off: one each for the Chinese New Year, the May Day vacation which the first week of 
May, and the National Day vacation which is the first week of October. We define the 
“incumbent” workers as those who have worked for 49 or more weeks, giving the workers a 
possible one-week absence due to personal or other reasons. There are 94 such incumbent 
workers, and we conduct our analysis, using data for all weavers as well as for only incumbent 
weavers.    
Finally, our informant reports that each weaver’s wage is determined by her seniority and 
individual performance. As shown in Dong, Jones and Kato (2007), to be consistent with the 
nature of main task of weavers and our informant’s statement, weekly earnings of weavers are 
indeed found to be significantly related to their tenure and defect rates. There is clearly a 
monetary incentive for weavers to lower their defect rates.  
Our informant also tells us that helping other weavers is not an important determinant of 
wage. There is no explicit and monetary incentive to help. However, participation in all team 
activities is mandatory and engaging in knowledge sharing is expected. We hypothesize that 
there is a strong norm among rural migrant workers who live in the same company dormitory, eat 
in the same dining hall, and socialize among themselves, and that the norm includes active 
knowledge sharing.    11
 
III. Empirical Strategy and Results 
Our baseline model, which we will build on to investigate our hypotheses concerning 
performance spillovers, is a simple fixed effects model:  
DEFRATEit = α + β TEAMDEFit + (individual fixed effects)  
+ (monthly time dummies) + γTENURE it + δ (TENURE it)
2 + εit (1) 
where DEFRATEit is defect rate of weaver i in week t; TEAMDEFit is the aggregate defect rate 
of her teammates excluding herself. The estimated coefficients on TEAMDEFit are used to test 
whether or not a weaver’s individual performance is influenced by her teammates’ performance 
(our estimates may be subject to the reflection problem
6 and we will address this issue as well as 
other concerns at the end of this section).      
We include individual specific fixed effects to capture the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity of our workers. In particular, individual specific fixed effects will attempt to 
control for differences among workers in their innate abilities.
7 We also include 11 monthly time 
dummy variables to capture time-specific shocks to the firm that are common to all weavers. 
(There are actually 12 monthly time dummy variables from April 2003 through March 2004.  We 
use the April 2003 time dummy variable as a reference month.)   
We also consider the tenure of the worker (the number of weeks for which she has been 
with the firm) and its square. However, due to multicollinearity between tenure and the time 
dummy variables, we expect imprecise estimates for tenure. All of our results (of course except 
for the tenure effects) are insensitive to whether or not we include the tenure variables.   
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of Eq (1). The estimated coefficient on TEAMDEFit 
                                                        
6 See, for instance, Manski (1993) and Haurin, Dietz and Weinberg (2002).  
7 Since there was no mobility of workers between teams during the time period under study, 
individual fixed effects also control for all time-invariant heterogeneity of teams.     12
for the total sample of weavers is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
suggesting that a one percentage-point decrease in the aggregate defect rate of the teammates 
will result in a 0.27 percentage-point decrease in one’s own defect rate. The results are similar 
even when we consider only incumbent workers.
8 
While the results are consistent with the presence of performance spillovers among 
workers in the workplace, an alternative interpretation is plausible. For example, due to a certain 
type of demand shock, a team may be assigned to a different set of products which are inherently 
more complex and hence cause all team members to struggle to keep their defect rates low, 
resulting in performance interdependence of all team members. 
However, the shock could also affect different weavers differently and provide 
opportunities for knowledge sharing. A high-ability worker may learn new skills and knowledge 
useful for adjusting effectively to new products and processes before her low-ability teammates. 
She will then share such new skills and knowledge with her low-ability teammates. In addition, 
high-ability workers could also work together to produce performance-enhancing local know 
ledges, resulting in horizontal performance spillovers among themselves.  
To shed light on the possibility of such knowledge sharing, we define the high and low 
ability level according to the estimated individual weaver fixed effects. The estimates of 
individual fixed effects show the workers’ predicted performance holding time effects, tenure, 
tenure squared, and average team performance constant. A “high-ability” worker is defined as 
someone whose fixed effects estimate is lower than the median. Likewise, a “low-ability” 
                                                        
8 All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity but not for cluster, for in general, when 
cluster fixed effects are used (which is our case), usual standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are 
valid and more powerful than cluster-robust standard errors (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007; Lecture 8). 
However, we did check if cluster-correction at the individual worker level makes any discernable 
difference in standard errors. As expected, cluster-correction caused standard errors to increase yet 
reassuringly almost all estimated coefficients that are statistically significant using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors remain statistically significant even if we use cluster-robust standard errors.     13
worker’s fixed effects estimate is higher than the median. (Note that we are using the rate of 
defect cloth produced. Thus a larger number indicates a lower quality and hence low ability). 
Specifically, we estimate: 
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(2) 
TEAMDEF_HIGHit, and TEAMDEF_LOWit, are the aggregate defect rate of her high-
ability and low-ability teammates respectively. We drop the Tenure variables for the rest of our 
regressions since they are insignificant and all of our results are insensitive to their inclusion. We 
run the above regression for four groups of weavers: the high-ability workers, the high-ability 
incumbent workers, the low-ability workers, and the low-ability incumbent workers. We expect 
unidirectional performance spillovers from high-ability workers to low-ability workers, but not 
the other way around. Moreover, synergic learning and local knowledge creating among high-
ability workers are expected. 
The results in Table 4 generally confirm our expectations. For the sample of low-ability 
weavers, as shown in Columns (iii) and (iv), the estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_HIGH is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level for all low-ability weavers and at the 5 
percent level for all low-ability incumbent weavers. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient 
on TEAMDEF_LOW is close to zero and highly insignificant.
9 Low-ability weavers appear to 
benefit from performance improvement of their high-ability teammates while they do not benefit 
from their peers (low-ability teammates), suggesting the possibility of knowledge sharing from 
high-ability to low-ability teammates.  
For the sample of high-ability weavers, as shown in Columns (i) and (ii), the estimated 
                                                        
9  The difference between the estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_HIGH and the estimated 
coefficient on TEAMDEF_LOW is also found to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the 
incumbent sample and at the 10 percent level for the total sample.    14
coefficient on TEAMDEF_HIGH is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for both total 
and incumbent samples, suggesting a synergic learning among high-ability weavers in the same 
team. The estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_LOW is much smaller and less significant (still 
significant at the 10 percent for the total sample but no longer significant even at the 10 percent 
level for the incumbent sample).
10  
We now turn to our key question: whether performance spillovers are molded by social 
network. We begin with a benchmark social network specification: 
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(3) 
TEAMDEF_RURALit, and TEAMDEF_URBANit,  are the aggregate defect rate of her 
rural and urban teammates respectively. We estimate the above fixed effect model again for four 
groups of workers: the rural workers, the rural incumbent workers, the urban workers, and the 
urban incumbent workers. 
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of Eq. (3). The estimated coefficient on 
TEAMDEF_RURAL is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for rural 
workers but not for urban workers. Likewise, the estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_URBAN 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for urban workers but not for rural 
workers.
11 Such evidence of performance spillovers within the same social network but not 
across social network is found for both the total sample and the incumbent sample.   
We are now ready to examine possible linkage between knowledge sharing and social 
                                                        
10 The difference between the estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_HIGH and the estimated 
coefficient on TEAMDEF_LOW is also found to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level for the 
incumbent sample and almost significant at the 10 percent level for the total sample. 
11 The difference between the estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_RURAL and the estimated 
coefficient on TEAMDEF_URBAN is also found to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level for 
the incumbent rural workers and at the 5 percent level for the total urban workers.     15
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where TEAMDEF_RURALHIGHit, TEAMDEF_RURALLOWit, and 
TEAMDEF_URBANHIGHit are the aggregate defect rate of her rural high-ability, rural low-
ability, and urban high-ability teammates respectively.  As show in Table 1, 21.2% of all weavers 
are rural high-ability workers. Since 62.3% of all weavers are rural, about one third of rural 
weavers are high-ability. On the other hand, the majority of urban workers are high-ability (close 
to 80%). Since there are very few urban low-ability weavers overall and such urban low-ability 
weavers are completely absent in some teams, we exclude them from our analysis. Thus, we 
estimate Eq. (4) for six different groups of weavers: (i) total rural high-ability weavers; (ii) 
incumbent rural high-ability weavers; (iii) total rural low-ability weavers; (iv) incumbent rural 
low-ability weavers; (v) total urban high-ability weavers; and (vi) incumbent urban high-ability 
weavers;        
Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of Eq. (4) for the rural low-ability workers. The estimated 
coefficients on TEAMDEF_RURALHIGH are positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level for both the total and incumbent samples whereas the estimated coefficients on 
TEAMDEF_RURALLOW and TEAMDEF_URBANHIGH are not statistically significant even 
at the 10 percent level (actually the estimated coefficients on TEAMDEF_RURALLOW are 
negative).
12 Using the estimated coefficients on TEAMDEF_RURALHIGH, we gauge the 
                                                        
12 The difference between the coefficient on TEAMDEF_RURALHIGH and the coefficient on 
TEAMDEF_RURALLOW as well as the difference between the coefficient on 
TEAMDEF_RURALHIGH and the coefficient on TEAMDEF_URBANHIGH are also found to be 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the incumbent sample. For the total sample, the difference 
between the coefficient on TEAMDEF_RURALHIGH and the coefficient on TEAMDEF_URBANHIGH   16
magnitude of the spillover effect from high-ability rural weavers to low-ability rural weavers, A 
0.1-percentage point fall in defect rate of her rural high-ability teammates from 0.21 to 0.11 will 
result in a 0.0176-percentage point fall (0.0326-percentage point fall for incumbent weavers) in 
defect rate of the average rural low-ability weaver. Since the average defect rate of rural low-
ability weavers is 0.255, the estimated quality improvement amounts to a 7-percent improvement 
(a 13-percent improvement for incumbent weavers).  The size of the spillover effect appears to 
be modest yet still economically significant.       
Table 7 summarizes the OLS estimates of Eq. (4) for their high-ability counterparts (rural 
high-ability workers). We find no statistically significant evidence for any performance 
spillovers for such rural high-ability workers.   
The results in Table 6, combined with those in Table 7 suggest that for rural weavers in our 
Chinese textile firm, performance spillovers occur only from high-ability to low-ability workers 
within the same social network (or among rural migrant workers). In other words, neither ability 
differentials nor social network is sufficient for performance spillovers to occur. High-ability 
weavers discover a useful local knowledge to improve their performance before low-ability 
weavers and transmit such new knowledge to low-ability weavers but such knowledge sharing 
take place only within the same social network.  
The above interpretation is further supported by the considerable difference in the estimated 
magnitude of performance spillovers between the total sample and the incumbent sample. The 
size of performance spillovers from rural high-ability to rural low-ability weavers almost double 
when we limit the sample to only incumbent workers. Opportunities for knowledge sharing must 
have been more limited  and social ties must have been weaker for workers who have not been 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
is also found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level (the difference between the coefficient on 
TEAMDEF_RURALHIGH and the coefficient on TEAMDEF_RURALLOW is not found to be 
significant at the 10 percent level).    17
around much during the time period under study.  
The OLS estimates of Eq. (4) for the urban high-ability workers are reported in Table 8. The 
estimated coefficients on TEAMDEF_URBAN HIGH are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level, pointing to performance spillovers amongst high-ability weavers within the 
urban network. The estimated coefficients on TEAMDEF_RURAL HIGH are much smaller and 
highly insignificant.
13 Performance spillovers amongst high-ability weavers do not go beyond the 
urban/rural social divide, which is yet another evidence for the important role of social network 
in performance spillovers in the workplace.  Finally, as expected, we find no statistically 
significant evidence for performance spillovers from low-ability to high-ability weavers.  
Horizontal performance spillovers amongst high-ability weavers are found for urban 
workers but not for rural workers. This may be due to the fact hat the pool of high ability 
weavers is substantially larger in the urban network than in the rural network (close to 80 percent 
of urban workers are high-ability while only one thirds of rural workers are high-ability). As such, 
the scope for knowledge sharing may be greater among urban high-ability weavers than among 
rural high-ability weavers.  
Finally, we address a number of concerns which may arise with our empirical strategy.  
First, our focus on quality (DEFRATE) poses a concern that weavers may try to reduce 
DEFRATE simply by reducing output. If this quality-quantity tradeoff issue were serious, our 
focus on quality would be misleading. However, as we discussed when describing the case, our 
field research suggests that the key individual performance variable for weavers at SCT is 
DEFRATE (quality), and while their discretionary efforts matter significantly for DEFRATE, 
there appears to be less room for discretion in terms of pace of production (or quantity). All 
                                                        
13 The difference between the estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_URBAN HIGH and the 
estimated coefficient on TEAMDEF_RURAL HIGH is also found to be statistically significant at the 1 
percent level for the incumbent sample as well as for the total sample.    18
weavers are required to fulfill planned output levels and they appear to do so on most occasions. 
As such, we expect the scope for the quality-quantity tradeoff to be quite limited for our weavers. 
To confirm our expectation, we estimated all of the above equations augmented by output 
(defined as meters of cloths produced per hour by each weaver) as an additional right-hand side 
variable. Reassuringly we found no evidence for the quality-quantity tradeoff (or the estimated 
coefficients on the output measure are very small and actually negative rather than positive), and 
more importantly all of our results on performance spillovers change little even if we include the 
output measure as an additional control
14  
Second, as we discussed earlier, the field research suggests that assignment of new weavers 
to teams may be safely assumed random. Following a methodology used by Sacerdote (2001) 
and Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2007), we test the random assignment assumption by 
using all weavers who joined SCT during the April 2003-March 2004 period and estimate: 
PDEFRATEi = α + βPTEAMDEFi  
+ (Entry Week Dummy Variables) +  εi       (5) 
where PDEFRATEi is predicted performance of a new weaver i (measured by estimated fixed 
effect from the baseline model) and PTEAMDEFi is her teammates’ predicted performance (also 
measured by estimated fixed effects from baseline model). The timing of each worker’s entry to 
SCT may influence her predicted performance. To control for such time effects, we add entry 
week dummy variables. The estimated coefficient on PTEAMDEFi turns out to be not at all 
significant even at the 10 percent level (t-values less than one), failing to reject the random 
assignment assumption (dropping the entry week dummy variables causes no discernable 
difference).  
                                                        
14 These and other unreported results are available from Takao Kato at tkato@mail.colgate.edu 
upon request.    19
Third, it may be possible that unexpected demand shocks end up affecting only a subset of 
teams (e.g., some teams are asked to start producing new products while the other continue to 
produce the same products), resulting in performance interdependence among all team members 
(Angrist and Lang, 2004).  We have shown, however, that weavers with different ability levels 
and social networks respond differently to such shocks, suggesting knowledge sharing within the 
team. For example, performance of rural low-ability weavers is found to improve as their rural 
high-ability teammates improve their performance while there are no such performance 
spillovers from their urban teammates. It is hard to explain such asymmetric performance 
interdependence between urban and rural teammates who are working in the same team. Some 
may still argue that shocks can be specific to urban workers in the team but not to rural workers 
in the same team. It is highly unlikely but still conceivable that certain demand shocks cause 
only rural workers in the team to start producing new products while their urban teammates are 
producing the same products. However, we have found that even within the same rural social 
network, performance of low-ability weavers improves with their high-ability teammates but not 
with their low-ability teammates. This finding does not appear to be consistent with the afore-
mentioned team-specific shock story.  
Forth, our finding of differential performance spillovers for different types of teammates 
within the same team suggests that the reflection problem may be less serious in our case. For 
example, our key finding of significant performance spillovers from rural high-ability to rural 
low-ability weavers is not subject to the usual reflection feedback mechanism since we find no 
significant reverse performance spillovers from rural low-ability weavers to rural high-ability 
weavers.  
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
  We have provided some of the first rigorous evidence on performance spillovers and 
social network in the workplace. The data we use are rather extraordinary –weekly data for 
rejection rates (proportion of defective output) for all weavers in a firm during a 12 months 
(April 2003-March 2004) period, more than 10,000 observations. Our fixed effect estimates first 
point to significant spillovers of performance from high-ability weavers to low-ability weavers. 
On the other hand, we have found no evidence for performance spillovers from low-ability to 
high-ability weavers. The findings are consistent with the knowledge sharing hypothesis that 
high-ability workers acquire valuable local knowledge and then share it with low-ability workers.  
  Second, we have further investigated possible interplay between such performance 
spillovers and social network. By exploiting the well-documented fact that an exogenously-
formed sharp divide between urban workers and rural migrant workers exists in firms in Chinese 
cities, we have found evidence that performance spillovers take place only within the confines of 
social network. Specifically rural low-ability weavers are found to improve their performance as 
their high-ability teammates (who are also rural migrants) improve their performance while rural 
low-ability weavers do not benefit from performance improvement of their high-ability 
teammates who are not rural migrants.   
  Such heterogeneous performance interdependence of workers within the same team 
suggests that our evidence for performance spillovers is less likely to be a result of team-specific 
shocks that generate spurious performance interdependence of all team members.  
  Finally, unfortunately we are unable to perform rigorous and decisive test on whether 
performance spillovers we observe are due to knowledge sharing or peer pressure. However, 
based on our field research which points to the firm’s strong emphasis on knowledge sharing   21
among their workers and the presence of rich opportunities (both formal and informal) for 
workers to engage in knowledge sharing, we are inclined to argue that the bulk of performance 
spillovers we observe are likely to be due to knowledge sharing. Furthermore, Mas and Moretti 
(2006) show that the peer effect is observed only when workers are watched by other workers. 
Each of our weavers is assigned to six or more loom machines and is required to pay exclusive, 
focused and educated attention to those assigned machines. She rarely has an opportunity to 
observe how well her teammates are working. In addition, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007) 
find that performance spillovers due to peer pressure tend to work not only from high-ability 
workers to low-ability workers (low-ability workers improve their performance to match their 
high-ability workers who are their friends) but also from low-ability to high-ability workers 
(high-ability workers lower their performance to match their low-ability workers who are their 
friends). The performance spillovers we observe are, however, unidirectional (only from high-
ability to low-ability workers not vice versa). In sum, knowledge sharing through formal 
mechanism (team meetings and training sessions) and informal mechanism (living in the same 
dormitory and socializing among themselves) appears to be a more plausible interpretation of our 
observed performance spillovers.          22
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics: Weavers' Individual Characteristics 
Variable Definition  Mean S.D.  N 
GENDER  =1 if the weaver is female  0.966 0.181 297
EDUC  =1 if the highest education is middle school  1.000 0.000 297
RURAL  =1 if the weaver has rural registration  0.667 0.472 297
TEAMSIZE  Average number of weavers in the team  10.579 1.343 18
RURAL*HIGH  =1 if the weaver is rural and high-ability  0.212 0.410 297
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period     
from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004.      
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Table 2 - Summary of Statistics:  Variables in the Analysis   
Variable Definition  Mean  S.D.   
DEFRATE  =100*Defect cloth/Total output  0.247  0.347    
TENURE  = Number of weeks been at the firm  466.517  301.158    
TENURE
2  = TENURE*TENURE  308325.600  331677.200    
 TEAM DEF  Aggregate defect rate of the teammates  0.229  0.078    
 RURAL HIGH DEF  Aggregate defect rate of the rural high-
ability workers in the team  0.210 0.114     
 URBAN HIGH DEF  Aggregate defect rate of the urban high-
ability workers in the team  0.223 0.120     
 RURAL LOW DEF  Aggregate defect rate of the rural low-
ability workers in the team  0.255 0.136     
 URBAN LOW DEF  Aggregate defect rate of the urban low-
ability workers in the team  0.257 0.281     
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 
2004. 
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Table 3 – The Fixed Effect Estimates of Performance Spillovers: 
Benchmark    
Group All     Incumbent        
Independent (i)       (ii)        
TEAM  DEFRATE  0.2717 ***  0.2101 ***    
   (4.04)    (3.41)       
TENURE 0.0002     -0.0002        
   (0.05)    (0.13)       
TENURE
2 0.0000  **  0.0000        
   (2.37)    (0.58)       
                      
R
2 0.4123    0.1652       
N 10077    4739       
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 
to the last week of March, 2004.  
The 1-week temporary workers are excluded, all of who worked for less than 15 hours during the week. 
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 - The Fixed Effects Estimate of Performance Spillovers: High-ability vs. Low-ability Workers 
Workers group     HIGH             LOW       
    All 
(i)      Incumbent 
(ii)      All 
(iii)      Incumbent 
(iv)   
TEAM DEF-                    
HIGH  0.1868   ***  0.2205  *** 0.3262   *  0.2659  **
  (3.08)     (2.88)    (1.85)    (2.23)  
LOW 0.0736    *  0.0633     0.0157       0.0087   
  (1.88)     (1.25)    (0.42)    (0.15)  
          
 R
2 0.1975     0.1808    0.4446    0.1647  
N 5510     3008    4478    1677  
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 
to the last week of March, 2004.  
The 1-week temporary workers are excluded, all of who worked for less than 15 hours during the week.   
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
The results are insensitive to whether or not tenure and tenure*tenure are included. Absolute values of t statistics are in 
parentheses.        
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5 - The Fixed Effects Estimate of Performance Spillovers: Rural vs. Urban Workers 
Workers group     RURAL             URBAN         
    All 
(i)      Incumbent 
(ii)      All 
(iii)      Incumbent 
(iv)     
TEAM DEF-                      
RURAL 0.1587    ***  0.1600  *** -0.0110     0.1276     
  (3.86)     (2.67)    (0.13)    (1.63)    
URBAN 0.1151       0.0325      0.2215 ***  0.1860 *** 
  (1.24)     (0.69)    (4.45)    (3.51)    
          
R
2 0.4677     0.1625    0.2357    0.1964    
N 6261     2546    3680    2095    
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period       
from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004.           
The 1-week temporary workers are excluded, all of who worked for less than 15 hours during the week.      
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
The results are insensitive to whether or not tenure and tenure*tenure are included. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.        
 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level. **statistically significant at the 5% level. *statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 6 - The Fixed Effects Estimate of Performance Spillovers on Rural Low-
Ability Workers 
       Rural-Low     
    All 
(i)      Incumbent 
(ii)     
TEAM DEF-            
RURAL HIGH  0.1763  ***  0.3261   *** 
  (3.55)    (3.97)     
URBAN HIGH  0.1823     0.0551       
  (1.01)    (0.87)     
RURAL LOW  -0.0340     -0.0408       
  (1.00)    (0.79)     
      
R
2 0.0803    0.2006     
N 3543    1224     
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period  
from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004.  
The 1-week temporary workers are excluded, all of who worked for less than 15 hours during the week. 
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
***statistically significant at the 1% level. **statistically significant at the 5% level. *statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 7 - The Fixed Effects Estimate of Performance Spillovers on Rural High-
Ability Workers 
       Rural-High 




TEAM DEF-     
RURAL HIGH -0.0409  -0.0716 
(1.40) (1.65)
URBAN HIGH 0.0118  0.0312 
(0.31) (0.40)






Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period  
from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004.  
The 1-week temporary workers are excluded, all of who worked for less than 15 hours during the week. 
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
***statistically significant at the 1% level. **statistically significant at the 5% level. *statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 8 - The Fixed Effects Estimate of Performance Spillovers on Urban High-
Ability Workers 
       Urban-High     
    All 
(i)      Incumbent 
(ii)     
TEAM DEF-            
URBAN HIGH  0.2239  ***  0.2387   *** 
  (4.99)    (4.88)     
RURAL HIGH  0.0150     0.0342       
  (0.47)    (0.95)     
RURALLOW -0.0346     -0.0392       
  (0.193)    (0.87)     
      
R
2 0.2400    0.2440     
N 2631    1410     
Source: All data provided by SCT. Data are for 297 weavers at SCT during the 53-week period  
from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004.  
The 1-week temporary workers are excluded, all of who worked for less than 15 hours during the week. 
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
***statistically significant at the 1% level. **statistically significant at the 5% level. *statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
 